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Violence is spreading all over the world. In Yemen this phenomenon is on the rise and its victims are increasing. Therefore, the Consultative Council (CC) organized a seminar during August 26-27 to address this issue. As a matter of fact, it is the first time that this phenomenon has been discussed. The seminar was attended by Dr. Abdulaziz Al-Saqqaf, chairman of the CC's Human Rights Committee a major organizer and contributor to the seminar. The discussions revealed many aspects of this phenomenon. The participants, most of them academics at Sanaa University, presented valuable papers on the topic. We will try to shed some lights on them.

Tribal Violence & Customary Rules & Law
This paper was presented by Dr. Salah Hadash, representative of the Ministry of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs at the Supreme National Committee for Human Rights, and lecturer at Sanaa University.
Violence could be a phenomenon in any social group, and the tribe is a social group that still exists in some parts of Yemen. There are many aspects of violence practiced by the tribe like blood vengeance, kidnapping, tribal shoot-outs, the carrying of firearms, etc.

1- Blood Revenge:
Conventional and tribal norms confess or recognize blood revenge as a means of retaliation. It gives the person the right to fire his gun at his enemy using only three bullets. If he is not able to seize this chance, he doesn't have the right to shoot him again. The revenge seeker may not commit this crime in crowded markets, which are assigned as safe areas for people to trade. The punishment is blood money and if it is not accepted, the death punishment is inevitable. The Law of Crimes and Punishment No. 12 of 1994 considers blood revenge a crime deserving capital punishment or blood money, if the relatives of the killed person accept. The number of blood revenge incidents in Yemen reached 1,257 during 1996.

2- Kidnapping:
The total number of kidnapping cases in Yemen between April 1991 and April 1998 was 124. Most of those kidnapped were foreigners, there were 146 men, women and children. Yemeni persons kidnapped were 22.
However, Yemen social conventions respect the safety of travellers and oblige the tribes to protect them. But these conventions don't specify any penalty against kidnappers. But according to the Article 249, the Law of Crimes and Punishments considers kidnapping a crime that has to be punished. The punishment, however, has become very severe according to the Law No. 24 of 1998 issued in August 3, 1998.

3-Inter-Tribal Wars:
The number of inter-tribal wars reached 62 in 1996. Such clashes occur between two or more tribes due to strong blood and family bonds. No conventional rule governs these shoot-outs. But the convention regulates some aspects of these conflicts. In the case of reconciliation between the warring tribes, the two tribes have to provide 44 persons to swear that they have not inflicted any casualties. Then, the penalty could be made in the form of blood money.

4- Arms Carrying:
Tribesmen carry a Jambia or a gun by way of social tradition without any license. Also there is not any conventional norm to organize the carrying of guns. On the contrary, Law No. 40 of 1992 states that a person should have a license to carry a firearm.

Recommendations:
1- Applying all the laws on all people and in all parts of the country, basing that on a constitutional rule that all people are equal.
2- Disarming the people and giving every person the right to carry one gun, only with a license.
3- Issuing a legal opinion (fatwa) that forbids blood revenge, instead giving the responsibility to the courts of law.
4- Opening more police stations all over the country.
5- Making more courts available all over the country.
6- Obliging people to register all their property at public land registers.
7- Solving all problems related to water rights.
8- Persuading the warring tribes to sign peace agreements to end all vengeance disputes.
9- Educating the tribesmen on the peaceful and democratic means, like filing court cases, through which they can protect their rights .
10- Providing the bedrock regions of blood revenge with education, health and transport services.
11-Educating the tribesmen through the different mass media about the concept of citizenship.

Violence & Youth
The second paper was presented by Dr. Mohammed Awad Ba-Obaid, psychology department, Sanaa University. The paper considered youth the most important group of people effected by violence. From this hypothesis, it focused on the extent of this phenomenon among youth and the reasons that lead them to commit crimes of violence. Juvenile violent incidents have increased between 1988 and 1991 from 2,343 to 3,136. The paper then recommended some solutions.

Violence in Yemeni Society
This paper was presented by Dr. Sadiq Shayif Noman. Violence is considered to be a social phenomenon found in almost all societies. But its reasons, factors and conditions might differ. The paper presented some aspects of violence:
1-Arms carrying.
2-Blood revenge.
3-Kidnapping.
4-Using all kinds of weapons in tribal disputes and conflicts.
5-Turning peaceful demonstrations into riots and violence.
6- Armed conflicts among mosque preachers or speakers.

Then, the paper introduced the causes of violence in Yemen:
1-The family and its way of bringing up children.
2- The milieu (tribe or social surrounding).
3- Economic conditions.
4- Political conditions.
5-Ignorance of religion and its abhorrence of violence.

Violence Targeting Women: Cause & Effect
The fourth paper was presented by Ms. Eshraq Ahmad Hasan Al-Iryani. It surveyed the causes and effects of violence against women. The main reasons cited by the researcher are:
1- Discrimination in raising males and females.
2- Spread of illiteracy (76.9% among women).
3- Clinging to out-dated traditions in the family.
4- Misunderstanding of Islamic rules and norms.

The results of violence against women are:
1- It distorts society's structure and values.
2- It affects women's physical and psychological well-being, which leaves its indelible mark on the personality of their children.
3- It is a violation of human rights.

Anti-Social Behavior
This paper was presented by Dr. Ali Saeed Al-Tariq, chairman of Psychology Department, Sanaa University. It has introduced five factors behind this anti-social behavior in society:

1- The family factor.
2- The psychological factor.
3- The social factor.
4- The economic factor.
5- The political & literacy factors.

The paper then presented the definition of the anti-social personality and its traits. Some of the these attributes are:
1-Inability to benefit from experience.
2- Absence of a sense of responsibility.
3- Recklessness.
4- Inability to be reformed by penalty.
5- Inability to feel guilty.

The paper recommended the following:
1- Establishing a supreme council to combat violence in Yemen to protect the rights of the people.
2- The importance of the role of the informative media.
3- Increasing the number of judges.
4- Activating the religious and political guidance to put a limit on crimes of violence.
5- Introducing new codes for organizing the carrying of firearms.
6- Increasing the number of courts all over the country for receiving many cases.
7- Solving all the political disputes between the political parties.
8- Educating and raising our children on the basis of the Islamic rules.

Fragile Judicial System
The sixth paper was presented by the lawyer Jamal-u-deen Al-Adeemy. He introduced many issues related to the judicial system in Yemen. The most important of which is the absence of respect to judges, lawyers and other people working in this institution.
The paper indicates that we can not talk about the independence of this system while harassment and violations are perpetrated against people working in it. The judicial system should be independent and powerful. The paper recorded 28 violent incidents targeting people working in this system. Then, it recommended the recording of violent incidents against people working in the judicial system and studying the reasons behind such violence, for it might help tackle this problem.

Violence
The seventh paper was presented by Dr. Abdulmalik Al-Makramy, head of Psychology Department, Sanaa University. He focused on violence in Yemen and its nature. The Yemeni society has witnessed many shocks and adversities during this decade, and it will also witness radical changes in the political and economic systems. Such adversities include the Gulf war and its aftermath, the 1994 civil war, rapid population growth, difficulties of balancing the political, the social and economic systems, and the launching of the economic reform process.
The paper recommended the following:

1-Taking care of the qualified manpower in Yemen.
2- Allocating a good amount of money for scientific research.
3- Rationalizing the political decision by relating it with scientific research.
4- Studying all social phenomena through research which should be conducted by specialists.
5- Holding more workshops and seminars on violence in Yemen.

Violence Against Women in The Media
This paper was presented by Ms. Sabriah Al-Thawr and Ms. Reda Qarhash. It highlighted the unacceptable way in which Yemeni women are portrayed by the media - very weak and controlled by their emotions. They are also incomplete in thought and religion. The paper also criticized the women newspapers and publications which do not address the essence of the problems facing Yemeni women. The recommendations were as follows:

1- Tackling the explicit and implicit abuse of Yemeni women.
2- The inevitable role of the mass media in raising public awareness towards women's dormant faculties and abilities.
3- Giving women's issues a good space in radio and television programs.
4- Choosing good programs to present the favorable aspects of women.

By Mohammed Al-Qadhi,
Assistant Managing Editor,
Yemen Times

Organized by Al-Wahdawi weekly newspaper, mouthpiece of the People's Nasserite Unionist Organization, a seminar on the upcoming presidential elections in Yemen was held on Sunday, August 31 at Hadda Hotel. Some papers were presented in the seminar by Dr. Mohammed Ali Al-Saqaff, Mr. Mohammed Hussein Al-Farah and Dr. Mohammed Abdulmalik Al-Mutawakil. Later, discussion was open for all. Here we try to give a brief summary of the main papers presented.

"Republican Imam" According to the Constitutional Power and the Nature of the Yemeni Political System

This paper was presented by Dr. Mohammed Ali Al-Saqaff. He considered the discussion of the October 1999 presidential elections to be a healthy phenomenon. The position of the president as a public office has been introduced with the constitutional amendments of September 1994, following the civil war. At that time the president was elected in parliament.
Then, the paper talked about the way in which the president is elected. Paragraph A of Article No. 105 of the Yemeni Constitution states that the president of the republic is the president of the government. Paragraph B states that the president nominates the vice president himself. So the difference is that the president is given legitimacy through elections, but the vice president is appointed or dismissed like any other official in the government.
Article No. 106 defines the characteristics that must be available in a presidential candidate. They are similar to those mentioned in the previous constitution. The difference is only in the minimum age of the candidate. In the past it was 35 but now it is 40.
If the results of the April 1997 parliamentary elections are taken into consideration, the paper says, it will be found that the candidate of either the People's General Congress (PGC) or the Islah party, will not find any difficulty in obtaining 10% of the parliament yes votes, around 30 vote out of 301. This is because the PGC got 187 seats and the Islah got 53. But if any other person stands for president, he would have to get yes votes from the five Nasserite and Baath representatives as well as the 25 independents. This is not enough for even one candidate from the opposition.
But what will happen if we have more than one candidate from the opposition. The PGC and the Islah might agree to have a candidate of their party so there is no chance for a candidate from the opposition to get the yes votes of at least 30 representatives. This restricts the MPs and makes them vote for only the candidates of their parties.
Constitutionally speaking, the political regime in Yemen is trying to separate the three authorities: legislative, executive and judiciary. But in reality it is trying to bring them together. This was only done by the Imam in the absence of a constitution, but it is practiced now with the presence of the constitution. This makes it very difficult to classify our system.
According to the constitution, the president is elected for 5 years with wide powers and privileges. Despite the constitution's emphasis of the judicial system's independence, it allows the president to have a certain role in the judiciary authority. Article No. 104 of the constitution states that the chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council is the president himself. He is also to issue the decisions concerning the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court.
The same thing happens also in the Supreme Elections Committee. For the president has the right to choose members of the committee from among the 10 people nominated by the parliament. This is on the level of laws. On the level of practice, the resignation of Dr. Faraj Bin Ghanem is a clear example. Article 118 gives the president the absolute freedom to choose the prime minister, but the prime minister has the right, according to Article No. 130, to choose his ministers in coordination with the president. Another example is what happened during the demonstration of Al-Dal'i. Some MPs asked for a fact-finding mission to investigate the matter. The response was that the president will do that himself. So, what is their job?!

Government & Opposition Choices in Upcoming Presidential Elections

Regime Choices
The second paper was presented by Dr. Mohammed Abdulmalik Al-Mutawakil, Sanaa University. He indicates that the regime has reached an impasse and has got only the following choices:
1- Self-reformation and permitting the establishment of the modern and democratic institutions in the country. The regime has also to accept the elimination of the powers acting behind the scenes.
2- President Saleh should not run for the coming presidential elections. He should not allow anybody else to use the public budget for his campaign.
3- The regime has also to permit the establishment of local authorities with wide powers so that the people themselves will be their own rulers and thus responsible for any mistakes they commit. In this way, the central authority will be absolved of any wrongdoing.
4- The regime may give no opportunity for the participation of others and depend completely on brute force. Thus, it will fall like its counterparts in Indonesia and Congo.
Dr. Al-Mutawakil thinks the first choice to be the best. But it is very difficult and a heavy burden on the regime according to its understanding of the government and the system. Therefore, the first choice is considered to be ideal.
The fourth choice is the worst of all. But it is clear that it is the vital one to the regime. That was very clear when the regime used violence to break down demonstrations a few months back. That really violated all international human rights conventions. The choice of using force is of an already known end. Unfortunately, it is the choice the regime believes in and clings to. This choice also co-exists with the mind of the regime.
The second and third choices cannot be ruled out too since President Saleh has sometimes earnest and courageous attitudes. However, the third choice is the most plausible one for there is no longer anything to give to the people except local rule.
Then, the paper introduces some defects of the opposition in Yemen:
1- The job of the opposition leaders is devoid of any sense of hard work and sacrifice. Therefore, they have never been models for youths stimulating them to look for a better future. On the contrary, they have been a disheartening factor.
2- The opposition has failed to unite and organize themselves, and to really address the people's problems.

Opposition Choices
The opposition parties are not better than the government. And so they have limited choices:
1- Working hard to enhance the power of the populace so that it can force the government to embark on real reform and changing the ruling people through honest elections.
This entails the availability of a good action program relying on democratic and peaceful struggle. The opposition leaders should sacrifice a lot for a good and tangible change. They should also participate in all kinds of elections.
2- Opposition parties joining together in an armed struggle to topple the regime.
3- The opposition should consider the coming local and presidential election as its real battle and should coordinate and work together to win it. They can benefit from the foreign monitoring so as to ensure free and fair elections.
4- The opposition can make a bargain with the PGC ensuring free and fair local elections and in return they support the candidate of the PGC in the presidential elections.
5- The opposition parties do not participate in the elections, particularly when they are not able to get 10% of the parliament votes needed for anybody to run for the presidential elections.
6- The last choice is that the opposition should look at the presidential elections as a means for mobilizing and educating the people about the government's attitude. It should also seize the opportunity as a means of communication with all the political and social forces in the country.
Dr. Mutawakil believes the choice of cultivating public support is a strategic one and that it should be the first concern of the opposition. The fourth choice is rather realistic and less dangerous to the country. The worst choices are the second and fifth, since the opposition will probably fail in both cases. The result of fighting is the destruction of both the opposition and the country.
Boycotting the elections is very passive and fruitless and not good for the opposition, since it keeps it away from the people. It also makes it unable to show its program and other alternatives to the public. In boycotting the elections, the opposition will not be successful in showing the illegitimacy of the elections neither inside or abroad. So, the second and fifth choices should be ruled out. The success of the opposition in adopting the other choices primarily depend on the ability of the opposition in coordinating their efforts. The possibility of success will be greater if the opposition is able to convince the Islah party to coordinate and cooperate with them. The opposition parties should also choose an acceptable person as their candidate so as to make the roots of democracy very deep. Even when the opposition cooperates with the PGC, choosing their own candidate is very important, no matter whether they succeed or fail. The most important thing is to take part.

Horizon of the Coming Presidential Elections

The third paper was presented Mr. Mohammed Hussein Al-Farah, member of the Nasserite Organization's political bureau. The paper indicates that Article No. 158 of the amended constitution states that the president is elected by the people. But it also stipulates that the president should be nominated by parliament. Thus, President Saleh was elected in October 1, 1994. He got 253 votes out of 259 (97% of those present and 84% of the total number of MPs), with 42 absentees.
Voting for the coming presidential elections should be conducted at the earliest on September 23, 1999. But many things can be said about the coming elections. The parliament presidium is not fair and neutral as the supreme election committee is. Another thing is that the possibility of getting the support of at least 10% of MPs for the opposition presidential candidate is very small. This is very clear if we look at the results of the April 1997 elections in which the PGC gained the lion's share followed by the Islah party. The minimum 10% support is therefore guaranteed for the candidate of the PGC and Islah. In this way the coming presidential elections is limited to the two big parties.
The paper adds that the results of the 1993 and 1997 elections can give us some information about the votes each party gained. For example, the Islah received in the 1993 elections 18% of the votes but in 1997 it got only 23%. Therefore, it is not possible for the candidate of the Islah to get 51% of the votes. But for the PGC which got 28% in 1993 and 43% in 1997, it is possible to get 51% of the votes. But there is something to be remembered. The failure of the PGC in keeping its promises of 1997, the price hikes it makes every time and the disgusting behavior of some of the PGC leaders - all these make the people very unhappy with the proposed candidate of the PGC. But things may become different if President Saleh doesn't stand as a PGC candidate. Then people may elect him on his personal merit.

By Yemen Times Staff